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The Emerging National Culture of Kenya:
Decolonizing Modernity
Olubayi Olubayi

Abstract
Kenya exists as a legitimate nation state that is recognized by
the United Nations and by other countries. This paper is an
exploration of, and a response to, the following two questions: "Is
there a national culture of Kenya?" and "what is the relationship
between the national culture of Kenya and the 50 ethnic cultures
of Kenya?" The evidence indicates that a distinct national
culture of Kenya has emerged and continues to grow stronger
as it simultaneously borrows from, reorganizes, and lends to,
the 50 ancient ethnic cultures of Kenya. The emerging national
culture of Kenya has several strong dimensions that include the
rise of a national language, the full acceptance of Kenyan as an
identity, the success of a postcolonial constitutional order, the
ascendancy of ecumenical religions, the urban dominance of
multiethnic cultural productions, increased national cohesion,
and the Sheng struggles to decolonize modernity.
The Emerging National Culture of Kenya: Decolonizing Modernity
For these patriotic defenders of the fighting cultures of African
people, imperialism is not a slogan. It is real .... the oppressed
and the exploited of the earth maintain their defiance: liberty
from theft. But the biggest weapon wielded and actually daily
unleashed by imperialism against that collective defiance is the
cultural bomb. The effect of the cultural bomb is to annihilate
a people's belief in their names, in their languages, in their
environment, in their heritage of struggle, in their unity, in their
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capacities and ultimately in themselves. Ngugi Wa Thiong)o
(1986) p. 3)

A national culture ofunity is emerging in Kenya in addition to) not in place of)
the 50 ancient ethnic cultures of Kenya. This emerging national culture acts as the
"glue" that holds the 50 ethnic groups together in one nation state. Without this
"glue;) the nation state would either remain "united" only through governmental
military and police force) or it would break up into 50 separate ethnic microstates.
It is the role ofthe emerging national culture to hold the nation together. A national
culture promotes a general voluntary acceptance of the legitimacy and sanctity of
the multiethnic, multicultural nation state. In Kenya, the national culture is just
evolving compared with the 50 mature ancient ethniccultures of Kenya. This is
why I refer to Kenya's national culture as emerging. Some dimensions of Kenya's
national culture are already at an advanced stage) while others are just beginning
to evolve. For example, the place of Kiswahili as the national language of Kenya is
already secure and advanced relative to the much weaker dimensions of national
constitutional faith, national consciousness, and national ideology.
In discussing the emerging national culture of Kenya, I will highlight only
some of the major solutions to the problems of coexistence and only some of the
mechanisms promoting national cohesion in Kenya as a means of illustrating
the active emergence of a national culture in Kenya. The highlights will include
the acceptance of "Kenyan" as an identity, the rise of a national language, the
proliferation of interethnic marriages, the "creation" of a national formal dress
code) the entrenchment of harambee, the flowering of the ecumenical religions,
the fight for a better constitution, the implementation of the Constituency
Development Fund (CDF)) the rooting in of universal primary education, the
rise of a national literature, the improvement of physical and communications
infrastructure, the widening of civil society, the revival of national political
history, the increasing celebration ofthings African, the build-up of resistance to
racism, the invention of Sheng, and the beginnings of a national consciousness,
of a national ideology, and of national cohesion in Kenya.
The emerging national culture is one of many cultures within Kenya. And
those many cultures are in active collaboration. It is my observation that the
emerging national culture of Kenya sits both above and between the 50 ancient
ethnic cultures, deriving strength and ideas from the ethnic cultures and from
the rest of our common global human heritage. The 50 Kenyan ethnic cultures
continue to exist and to flourish despite the emergence of an overarching
supraethnic national culture. It is not an either or situation. The growth of the
national culture does not mean the death of ethnic cultures. Cultures can and
often do coexist. And the identities of a Kenyan do not have to be singular.
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To inhabit this overarching supraethnic national culture of unity does
not preclude a Kenyan from maintaining full ethnic identity. Human beings
simultaneously inhabit several identities as so well explained by the Indian
economics Nobel laureate and philosopher, Amartya Sen, in his essay «Making
Sense of Identity;) in which he says:
We are all individually involved in identities of various kinds in
disparate contexts, in our own respective lives, arising from our
background, or associations, or social activities . . . . the same
person can be for example a British citizen, of Malaysian origin,
with Chinese racial characteristics, a stockbroker, a nonvegetarian,
an asthmatic, a linguist) a body builder, a poet, an opponent of
abortion, a bird watcher) an astrologer, and one who believes that
God created Darwin to test the gullible. (Sen, 2006, p.24)
Amartya Sen is insistent that when we push a person into a singular identity,
be it cultural or religious or ethnic, we miniaturize the person. It is the multiple
identities that we all inhabit simultaneously that enable civic life and citizenship.
We associate· with other citizens because we share some of our multiple identities
with them. The emerging overarching supraethnic national culture of unity is
founded on our multiple identities and borrows freely from all the 50 ethnic
identities in the country and from global sources.
To paraphrase Sen, the same person can be, for example, a Kenyan citizen,
of Turkana origin) with Masai ethnic characteristics, a teacher) a nyama choma
eater, a football player, a dancer, a Christian, an alumnus of Alliance High School,
and an in-law to a Kikuyu family. Such a person can associate with thousands of
his fellow citizens on each ofhis different identity dimensions: With fellow Turkana
ethnics he will build on shared language, with fellow teachers he will invoke the
experience of being a teacher, at the nyama choma bar he will find compan~ at
the football field or at the bar watching football he will feel at home, at the dances
he will have partners who share not ethnicity but a love of dancing) at church he
will enjoy Christian fellowship, among Alliance High School alumni he will revel
in their common elitism and mutual concerns, and with his in-laws he will share
in the joy of family life as facilitated by the Kiswahili national language and by the
emerging sense of shared membership within the same national culture of Kenya.
The most revolutionary dimension ofthe emerging national culture of Kenya
is the growing voluntary mutual acceptance ofthe sanctity and legitimacy of one's
neighbor)s ethnic culture, and the accompanying acceptance ofmultiple mutually
reinforcing ceremonies in important cultural human life cycle events such as
marriage, birth, and death. This means) for example, the now commonplace
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interethnic marriage ceremonies in Kenya are conducted not as a one-day event
in the manner of an American wedding, but as a series of mutually reinforcing
ceremonies that acknowledge all the key identities that the bride and groom
inhabit. If a Luo man is marrying a Kikuyu woman, for example, there will usually
be three major public weddings: the Kikuyu traditional-ngurario wedding at the
bride's home, the Luo traditional wedding at the groom's home, and the Christian
or Islamic wedding at a church or mosque.
Although many Kenyans perceive Raila Odinga (the main presidential
opposition candidate) who is ethnically Luo, to be the main threat to the continuity
of Kikuyu governmental power under President Kibaki who is ethnically Kikuyu,
those who are interested in the complexity of the emerging national culture of
unity in Kenya should note that the most widely read newspaper in Kenya, The
Daily Nation, reported on its front page on March 18, 2007, that Raila Odinga's
son, Mr. Fidel Castro Odinga, married Ms. Veronica Wangunyu in a Kikuyu
wedding ceremony, the ngurario, in which the Luo bridegroom and Kikuyu bride
publicly shared, not a neutral Western cake, but a piece of Kikuyu-blessed goat
meat as a symbol of the beginning of their matrimonial union as required by
the ancient Kikuyu ngurario rites. Mr. Fidel Castro Odinga was not required to
undergo a Kikuyu circumcision initiation into adulthood in order to qualify to
marry a wealthy Kikuyu bride. Instead, Mr. Fidel Castro Odinga's new parentsin-law implicitly applied a broadened sense of qualification to marry, which
recognized Luo initiation practices and the individual qualifications ofthe groom.
And it should be noted that the «ancestor" after whom Mr. Fidel Castro Odinga is
named is not Luo, but is the Cuban revolutionary who is a respected ideological
role model for the Odingas. This highly publicized Kikuyu ngurario highlighted
the Kenyanization of ethnic traditions. The Kikuyu ngurario was Kenyanized in
the sense that the rites and the attendant sympathies were enlarged to include a
multiethnic audience, and to acknowledge the sanctity and legitimacy of nonKikuyu, Luo qualifications and individual qualifications for marriage, and the
ngurario blessings were effectively extended to fully include a new son-in-law
who may be from a different ethnic group, but is now a bona fide member of
the newly expanded «imagined community:' to use Benedict Anderson's famous
phrase (Cohen & Kennedy, 2000, p. 377).
The guests at Ms. Veronica Wangunyu's ngurario represented all the major
regions and major ethnic groups of Kenya, and the formal dress of the most
distinguished guests such as the Honorable Mama Ngina Kenyatta, the widow of
Kenya's first President, and Mrs. Ida Odinga, the mother of the groom, was West
African. West African formal attire, and not the Western suit, is nowadays the
ceremonial attire of most of Kenya's emerging upper class and of most of Kenya's
most impressive thinkers. For example, it is usual to see Kenya's most respected
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cultural philosopher, Ngugi Wa Thiong'o, in his Kenyanized West African formal
shirts; and it is usual to see Kenya's most celebrated political scientist, Ali Mazrui,
with his Kenyanized Ghanaian Kente draped on his shoulders; and it is equally
usual to see Kenya's distinguished political historian, Eric Masinde Aseka, lecture
in his Kenyanized West African suits. Likewise, the globally recognizable visage
of Kenya's Nobel laureate, Prof. Wangari Muta Mathai, is that of Mathai in her
Kenyanized West African formal dress and headgear. This positive Kenyanization
of West African formal dress is a way of silently announcing that, in a world of
postcolonial African reassertion, the best does NOT have to be Western.
Like the situation described for marriages above, the birth ofchildren, and the
birthdays of children, in virtually all of Kenya's urbanized spaces (which include
small towns, bigger towns, and cities) are multiethnic events that are attended by
workmates and former schoolmates and friends of friends representing multiple
ethnic backgrounds.
The multiethnicity witnessed around urban births is also seen around
deaths and funerals. Death, within Kenya's urbanized spaces, is handled in
very similar ways by virtually all Kenyan ethnic groups: The place of burial
is still almost always the paternal ancestral home. This means, for most
families, that Harambee-style fundraisings attended by workmates, friends,
and friends of friends from many different ethnic.backgrounds are conducted
to raise money for transporting the body for burial. And the religious prayers
are usually at a church or mosque and similar for the majority of Kenyans
who are either Christian or Muslim. Although church or mosque prayers for
the dead have become customary for most Kenyans, they are not done in full
substitution for older traditional burial practices; they are done in addition
to, not in place of, the ethnic-based religious burial practices that in most
cases have been shortened and modified as demanded by new arrangements
of work and living spaces.
The Harambee collaborations and fundraisings that are witnessed around
arrangements for weddings and funerals are part of a more general national ethos
ofgroup self-help in which "the -in-group" is increasingly a multiethnic entity that
is constituted on many bases that go beyond ethnicity, when citizens maintain
friendships on the bases of shared experiences at school or at work, shared
interests, and shared goals. Harambee is a philosophy and a practice of self-help
that was heavily promoted by Kenya's first president, Mzee Jomo Kenyatta, and
remains a strong national practice that contributes heavily to the advancement
of national cohesion in Kenya. From independence, Kenya's founding president,
Mzee Jomo Kenyatta "became the cornerstone of multi-ethnic and multi-racial
stability in post-colonial Kenya as there was a remarkable degree ofunity centered
almost entirely on his personality" (Aseka, 1992, p. 40).
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What the political scientist Sanford Levinson (1989) has called "constitutional
faith;' in his book of the same title, and refers to the complex web of beliefs
that provide cohesion and national identity to a multiethnic, multiracial, and
multicultural modern nation, is not yet fully developed in Kenya. The current
intense public debates and activism over questions of constitutional rewriting in
Kenya are an attempt by Kenyans to construct the kind of constitution that will,
over time, provide Kenya with the "constitutional faith" that is currently absent.
The gap left by this missing secular constitutional faith is currently occupied
by the ecumenical Christian and Islam religions, and by ubuntu. And so, these
ecumenical religions, together with ubuntu, are an essential part of the emerging
national culture of Kenya.
Christianity is the religion of about 70% of Kenyans nowadays; Islam is the
religion of about 10% of Kenyans; and the remaining 20% of the population
practices nonecumenical faiths such as ancient African religions, Hinduism,
Judaism, and so on. The success of Christianity in Kenya is a spiritual solution
to the crises of indigenous religions in Kenya. In the past, ethnic nationalities
of present-day Kenya practiced nonecumenical ethnic-specific religions that
still inform the ethnic rituals and traditions of each of the 50 ethnic groups.
Imperialism, colonialism, forced and voluntary migrations, and the resultant
changes in living spaces, work, education, and the new ethnic juxtapositions
created a crisis of ethnic-specific religions because the new changes called for
a much more ecumenical moral order that Christianity and Islam provided.
Although many Africans were forced and deceived into Christianity by colonial
forces, the full acceptance and celebration of Christianity in postcolonial Kenya
cannot be understood within the framework ofcolonial force. Kenyans today have
the open option to abandon Christianity, but 70% of them have enthusiastically
chosen to keep it. I think that the best explanation lies in the fact that it is easier
for intimately multiethnic societies such as Kenya to enable coexistence within an
ecumenical religious framework that identifies one's new neighbor or workmate
or school mate or spouse as a fellow sister or a fellow brother in Christ, or in the
case of Islam as a comember of the umaa, that is, the religious community.
Christianity in most of Kenya and Islam in coastal Kenya provide powerful
spiritual and philosophical foundations for a shared moral order that is essential
to the emerging national culture of Kenya, and will complement the still weak,
but evolving national consciousness and national ideology in Kenya. It is these
ecumenical religions that have provided an effective foundation for a broad and
inclusive set of mutual sympathies that are open to all ethnic groups and that
attempt to define everybody as a sibling without regard to ethnic or racial identi~
Ubuntu or "mtu ni watu," that is, the African philosophy and spiritualcultural ethic of caring for and respecting others, including strangers, is as
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important as Christianity and Islam in providing an ecumenical moral framework
for multiethnic and multiracial coexistence in Kenya today, as elsewhere in
Africa. Ubuntu teaches that it is not enough for a person to be an individual,
that the flowering of a person's individuality is enhanced by the web of human
relationships that she or he inhabits, that she or he is a person because of other
people. In my own experience, it is from my peasant grandmother, and my
mother, and my father, and from our peasant neighbors in Kakemer village that
I was first introduced to the ethical imperatives of respect and care for human
relations and respect for all people regardless of ethnicity. The basis of respect
that I was taught as a child was not ethnicity, but age and character, and this
early childhood education in ubuntu formed the foundation for my success in the
multiethnic boarding schools in which I was educated in Kenya, and for success
in the multiracial global universities in which I was educated in the United States
of America. Reflecting on the existing capacity for coexistence and organization
within African cultures, Williams (1987) declared that:
When, if ever, black people actually organize as a race in their
various population centers, they will find that the basis and
guiding ideology they now seek and so much need is embedded
in their own traditional philosophy and constitutional system,
simply waiting to be extracted and set forth. (p. 161)
The people of Kenya, are in Williams's words, ((extracting)) from their ancient
ethnic cultures, and from global sources, and setting forth a national culture.
What are the governmental initiatives that promote the rise of a national culture?
The governments of Kenya, from colonial times to the present, have done many
bad things, but they have also done some good things. Some of the good things
were governmental initiatives; and some of them were a result of democratic
pressure from the people. Among the most notable ofthe governmental initiatives
that contribute heavily to the rise of a national culture are the building of the
national infrastructure of roads and telecommunications, the establishment
of provincial and national schools, the institutionalization of Kiswahili as a
subject of mandatory study in public schools nationwide, the promotion of a
national literature curriculum as demanded by political activists, the creation of
a Ministry of Gender, Sports, Culture, and Social Services, and the establishment
of a Constituency Development Fund.
The Kiswahili language became a subject ofmandatory studyin all public primary
and secondary schools in Kenya in 1986. This governmental language mandate
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accelerated the linguistic dimension ofinterethnic communication and facilitated the
rise of a national culture in Kenya. Although mastery of only English and Kiswahili
is helpful in enabling one to live and work successfully in any part of Kenya, it is
simultaneously limiting because the failure to speak a regional ethnic language marks
one off as ((foreign" and therefore unfit for political office in that region. And this is
why a Kenyan cannot run for elective political office in rural regions of Kenya unless
she or he speaks the local regional language. This absence of broad multilingualism
in the current generation ofKenyan leaders is slowing the rate at which national unity
can be deepened in rural Kenya and simultaneously privileging the cities and towns
as the centers for the flourishing of the emerging national culture.
Free universal primary education has been instituted by the government of
Kenya nationwide with the aim of achieving 100% adult literacy. Adult literacy
is currently at 80%. Because this free education inculcates a mastery of basic
writing and reading in Kiswahili and English, it is the most effective tool for social
cohesion, enabling all Kenyans to communicate with each other nationwide, and
to live and work in any part of the county.
Literature, in the nationwide curricula in English and in Kiswahili,
provides each generation of Kenyans with powerful shared stories, and
common thoughts, common sympathies that contribute heavily to the
presence of a feeling of common membership within the same generation,
within the same national culture, in the same country. The political role of
in-school literature when a common nationwide curriculum is mandated
by government is one of the most effective means of promoting a sense of
national unity because people feel closer to each other when they share
narratives, and when their own individual narratives and sensibilities are
influenced by ideas and insights from common sources. There are millions of
Kenyans that together laughed and cried as they read and discussed the joys
and tragedies that engulfed Grace Ogot's characters in The Promised Land.
And there is a generation of Kenyans for whom Ngugi Wa Thiong'o's fictional
village of Ilmorog in ((Petals of Blood;' and in ((Devil on the Cross;'conjures
up many images of struggle, corruption, disappointment, and hope. Just as
each ethnic culture has had its own narratives in Kenya, and continues to do
so, the emerging national culture of Kenya has its own common narratives
that are embedded in the new Kenyan literature, and in the new songs and
creative productions of Kenyans.
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What have been the roles of political dissenters and of civil society in fighting for
a Kenyan national culture?
Frantz FanoI1, in his classic work, The Wretched afthe Earth (1963), observed that:
History teaches us that the anti-colonialist struggle is not
automatically written from a nationalist perspective . . . . This
fight for democracy against man's oppression gradually emerges
from a universalist, neo-liberal confusion to arrive,
sometimes laboriously, at a demand for nationhood. But the
unpreparedness of the elite, the lack of practical ties between
them and the masses, their apathy and, yes, their cowardice at
the crucial moment in the struggle, are the cause of tragic trials
and tribulations. (p. 63)
Thousands of Kenyans risked or lost their lives starting in 1966 when the
Kenyatta government turned into a dictatorship, and throughout the brutal
24-year dictatorship of the Moi regime, in their "fight for democracy against
man's oppression" and in their struggles to diffuse and to eliminate dictatorship in
order to free up the creative energies of the masses that are requisite for building
an effective national culture.
The struggles of the political dissenters and of civil society generally have
had a strong national orientation and have evolved a nonethnic dimension of
Kenyan politics in which many political conflicts and political debates are about
issues that have nothing specific to do with ethnicity. This is not to deny the
near ubiquitous power of ethnicity in Kenyan politics, but to highlight the fact
that political life in a modern nation within a global economy cannot really be
reduced to the colonial notions of African "tribalisms:' It should be noted that the
loudest critic ofthe Kikuyu-led Kenyatta regime was Ngugi wa Thiongo, who like
Kenyatta, is ethnically Kikuyu, and was detained by Kenyatta. And the biggest
critic of Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, Kenya's first vice president, was Tom Mboya,
who like Odinga, was ethnically Luo. And in recent times, the biggest challenge
to the current Kibaki regime in Kenya, which led to the resignations and firings
of some of Kibaki's key allies in 2005, was waged by Mr. John Githongo who,
like Mr. Kibaki, is Kikuyu. Githongo's fight against Kibaki is based on Githongo's
contention that the Kibaki government is corrupt; it is not based on the fact that
Mr. Kibaki is Kikuyu. The head of the official opposition is Mr. Uhuru Kenyatta
who is critical of Mr. Kibaki despite a shared ethnicity. It is also worth recalling
that the forces that brought Mr. Kibaki to power were multiethnic and premised
on the desire to rid the country ofMr. Moi's 24-year dictatorship in order to open
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up democratic spaces in Kenya (Obbayi, 2007).
Civil society organizations in which citizens of Kenya freely associate on the
basis of shared goals and common interests have proliferated into thousands. It
is these civil society organizations that push for the opening and protection of
democratic spaces that actually promote our common citizenship and place limits
on governmental power. Some of the most noteworthy include the Federation
of Women Lawyers Kenya (FIDA Kenya), whose goal is gender equality and
the protection of women, the Green Belt Movement of Professor Wangari Muta
Mathai, and the Kenya Human Rights Commission, whose motto is «to enhance
the enjoyment of all human rights by all Kenyans:' Civil society organizations have
continued to be an arena that is both multiethnic and multiracial, as a few politically
progressive Kenyans of Asian origin and of European origin have remained
involved in our common human progressive struggles that are contributing to the
emergence of a national culture that promotes peaceful coexistence.
One of the most important achievements of the civil society struggles in
the area of Kenyan political history has been to force the government of Kenya
to recognize Kenya's political heroes. And the most recent example of this is
the erection of Honorable Dedan Kimathi's statue. On February 18, 2007, the
government of Kenya formally unveiled a 7- foot tall bronze statue of the Mau
Mau Land and Freedom War hero, the Honorable Dedan Kimathi, on a 10- foot
pedestal on Kimathi Street, in the middle of the business district in Nairobi,
Kenya. Kimathi now stands tall with his head towering 17 feet above street level
on a street named for him. Kimathi was murdered by the British on February
18, 1957, and resurrected by Kenyans on February 18, 2007, fifty years later.
Kimathi's resurrection is the most dramatic reminder that civil society forces are
increasingly effective in imposing democratic demands on the government of
Kenya to recognize Kenya's political history, which is an essential dimension of
the emerging national culture of unity. At the formal unveiling, Vice President
Moody Awori stood next to the Honorable Mukami Kimathi, the widow of
the Land and Freedom War hero. Kenya's colonial and neocolonial history
had kept the Kimathis veiled and out of sight. The British colonial masters and
their neocolonial clients of the Kenyatta and Moi regimes had no intention of
welcoming «dirty natives" like Kimathi into their city center. But the people had
spoken and forced the government to join them in their ceaseless struggle to
Africanize their city, which was always built by their labor despite the claims of
global capital and British colonialism.
A few minutes walk from the new Dedan Kimathi statue, KoOsewe, which is
Nairobi's first modern multiethnic African foods restaurant, is located on Kimathi
Street. An afternoon at KoOsewe will awaken the most determined skeptic to
the reality of the emergence of organic institutions of national unity in Kenya.
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Middle-class Kenyans of all ethnic, racial, and regional backgrounds crowd at
KoOsewes to sample the varied cuisines from the various ethnic regions ofKenya.
To understand the significance of KoOsewe as a cultural landmark in Kenya, one
must take into account that, one, colonial governments forcibly excluded African
cuisines from modern restaurants in the city center, and two, that KoOsewe is
the only upscale restaurant in Nairobi's central business district that is proud to
dedicate itself to multiregional, multiethnic Kenyan cuisines seven days a week.
The new Kenya of citizenship for all
Kenya is in the process ofrising above the past brutal experiences ofenslavement,
colonization, and neocolonialist dictatorship, and in the process of redefining
itself in many dimensions. This new Kenya is actively building a national civil
society, intensely negotiating a new inclusive constitution that protects the
rights of all humans within the borders of Kenya, and forcefully erecting a new
national culture of unity as a complex attempt by millions of people to solve
the problems of living together in a rapidly changing world. In this process
of self-reinvention, it will do Kenyans great good to heed the warnings and
reminders of the Kenyan political scientist Ali Mazrui (1980), who advises
Africa to modernize without Westernizing:
If modernity is defined according to these three basic
principles of responsiveness to the highest levels of knowledge,
encouragement of innovation, and enlargement of social
sympathies, there are clearly different roads to modernity. For the
Third World the best way of modernizing without Westernizing
is, on the one side to adopt those three principles of modernity
that I have mentioned and, on the other to pursue strategies of
decolonization and of reducing dependency. What is needed is a
dual effort to modernize and decolonize at the same time-it is
an effort to decolonize modernity. (p. 80)
A little reflection will remind us that Mazrui is right even for the history of
Kenya's colonial master, Britain. The recognizably advanced and scientific
culture of Britain is directly dependent on a borrowed Greco-Roman alphabet
(that is an Egyptian derivative) and a borrowed Arab numbers mathematical
system (that is an Indian derivative). Britain modernized without having to
invent its own alphabet and without having to invent its own numbers, and yet
it remained distinctly British. This seems to be Mazrui's challenge to Africa: to
modernize without Westernizing, as Britain modernized without Arabizing
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itself. The historical insights of the Indian economist and philosopher, Amartya
Sen, reinforce Ali Mazrui's advice on modernization without Westernization.
Sen has written that the free borrowing of the best ideas from our common
human heritage should not be mistaken for Westernization because a lot of what
is assumed to be Western in the modern world is part of the collective human
heritage that did not begin in the West. Sen observes that:
It is similarly important to see how so-called Western science
draws on a world heritage. There is a chain ofintellectual relations
that link Western mathematics and science to a collection of
distinctly non-Western practitioners. For example the decimal
system, which evolved in India
Went to Europe via the
Arabs .... consider printing which
occurred far away from
Europe. (Sen, 2006, p.56)
The Sheng Generation and Sheng Culture in the New Kenya
For the majority of Nairobians below the age of25, the place of birth is Nairobi,
and often their first language is Kiswahili, and not the regional ethnic language
of their mothers or fathers. This generation is often referred to as the Shenggeneration because they have created their own hybrid language that sits between
Swahili and English and borrows heavily from Kikuyu, Kamba, Luo, and the
other major ethnic languages. For example, the most commonly recognized
word across Kenya nowadays for the concepts of intimate conversations and
accompanying gossip is moshene' from the Kikuyu language, and the most
famous Sheng arts festival held in celebration of 40 years of independence in
2003 was named maboomboom or mabumbumbu from the coastal Giriama
language (see www.magicalkenya.com).
Sheng is both a language and an urban cultural style that is the linguistic
emblem of the new hybrid urban-ethnic group that I will call Shengites. The
Shengites are hybrid culturally and often hybrid ethnically as well, as many of
them are the children of interethnic marriages. For example, 8 of my 10 nieces
and nephews in Nairobi are genealogically multiethnic as their parents are from
different ethnic communities, and this is nowadays a commonplace development
in Nairobi. The interactions and mutual borrowings among standard English,
standard Kiswahili, and Sheng are really the Kenyan domestication of Englishthey are a way of announcing that English is no longer foreign, and Kiswahili is
no longer a language of the Waswahili ethnic community, but of all of Kenya.
This is in keeping with Mikhail Bakhtin's insight that «language becomes one's
own only when the speaker populates it with her own intention, her own accent,
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when she appropriates the world) adapting it to her own semantic and expressive
intention . . . . expropriating) forcing it to submit to one)s own intentions and
accents) is a difficult and -complicated process" (Bakhtin) as cited in Narayan)
1997) p. 2).
Nairobi's Sheng hybridity is best understood within the framework of what
the cultural theorist Homi Bhabha (2004) has called hybridity and third space.
Sheng is hybrid in the obvious sense of being a recent product of the interactions
of several languages and several ethnic groups within one complex urban space;
and it has been created in a third space) between and above) ancient languages)
and between ancient ethnic communities sharing physical) social) economic)
political) and psychological spaces in the city of Nairobi. Sheng culture is a loud
resistance to the attempt to force a cosmopolitan generation into narrow ethnic
spaces and into narrow ethnic identities that they sense as attempts to stifle their
broad ambitions and organic lived experience of ethnic-multiculturalism.
The Sheng generation has rejected imposed narrow definitions and insisted
on being) in what Antonio Gramsci (1971) terms) "what one really is ....
as a product of the historical process:) The millions of Shengites in Kenya are
from two streams. The dominant stream in cultural production is that of young
Kenyans born and raised in the cities and towns (who have never lived in
the rural villages). The other stream) which is numerically dominant) is that
of young Kenyans born in the rural villages) but not of the rural villages in
the sense that they were educated in the boarding school system and have
placed their dreams and aspirations outside the rural village of their birth.
Although raised outside of the cities) the rural Sheng stream is educated in a
network of thousands of urbanized boarding schools that are multiethnic and
psychologically linked to the urban -Sheng stream through their dreams) music)
interschool competitions) travel, visits to relatives) dates) newspapers) radio)
T~ cell phones) the internet) and books.
As a product of the Kenyan boarding school system myself) I can attest
to the fact that the interpersonal relations and ties developed in boarding
school (where the majority of Kenyan children acquire their secondary school
education) are just as strong) if not stronger) than the ties of a common-blood
ethnicity. The Kenyan boarding school system is really one of the most powerful
machines involved in the production of what the philosopher Kwame Anthony
Appiah (2006) has called the "habits of coexistence: conversation in its older
meaning) of living together) association" (p. xix). The provincial and national
secondary boarding school system in Kenya is an academic infrastructure in
the service of coexistence and national unity in Kenya. As early as the 1930s) it
was at boarding school at the Alliance High School that the future nationalist
Oginga Odinga expanded his capacity of "living together" and his role models

236

Journal of Global Initiatives

beyond ethnic Luoland when according to his biographer, E.S. Atieno Odhiambo
(n.d), "here he met students from all over Kenya, which impressed him and
made many friends" (p.3), and James Samuel Gichuru, a non-Luo became one
of Odinga's mentors and role models.
As young Kenyans struggle to name their struggle and to contribute to the
building of the emerging national culture, it should not be surprising that the
most famous of the Sheng musicians is a man actually known as Nameless.
Mr. Nameless is struggling to construct and to name the Sheng culture and
the Sheng politics of his generation. Part of the naming process has included
taking back popular culture and popular sports from total foreign domination.
Starting in 2002, the lead selling music albums for young Kenyans were no
longer Western imports, but local Sheng productions such as Nameless's
famous Ninanoki music album. Prior to the Sheng generation,- mentally
colonized Kenyans signaled their achievement of cosmopolitan sophistication
by projecting a rejection of African art forms, and by appearing Western and
listening to American music. Not so with Nameless and his generation. Their
sophistication, which is much admired by their generation, is premised on
being Kenyan, on being Sheng. The Sheng generation has actively rejected
the near total subservience to things Western that was emblematic of their
parents' generation. To them things African are equal to things Western and
can be mixed at will.
In the spheres of popular culture and of fine arts, there are now Sheng
productions in Kenya that cannot be pigeonholed into the narrow frozenethnic spaces of so-called tribal art that racists and Eurocentrics insist on for
African creations. The world class works of the sculptor Kioko Mwitiki, or the
amazing works of the painter Peter Ngugi, or the near-priceless pottery of the
ceramicist Magdalene Odondo cannot be classified as Kamba or Kikuyu or Luo
or traditional, but as Kenyan.
In highlighting the artistic Sheng creations of Nameless or Kioko Mwitiki or
Peter Ngugi or Magdalene Odondo, the point is not to claim that art should be
nonethnic, but to underscore the fact that African cultures are not frozen, but like
all human cultures, they are breathing and growing and learning and expanding
and involved in mutual borrowings from our shared common human heritage. The
second point is that persons whose lives are lived in spheres of multiculturalism
and multiethnicity will create within a multicultural, multiethnic context and
will contribute to the national culture that forms part of the glue necessary for
coexistence. And the third point is that just as there continue to be identifiably
Masai or identifiably Kikuyu art forms, between the identifiably ethnic art forms
there are emerging nonethnic and national Kenyan Sheng art forms that speak to
the emergence of a national culture in Kenya.
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Sheng political criticism has been waged most effectively through the device
of popular comedy and unifying critical popular music. The most notable of the
masters of political comedy in Kenya is the group RedyKulass, which commands
a nationwide and a diaspora-wide following among Kenyans. Redykulass has
employed comedy to criticize governmental excess in Kenya, and Redykulass
contributed heavily to the democratic removal of the Moi dictatorship from
power in 2002. The other major contributor to popular political criticism from
the music world is the group Gidi Gidi Maji Maji, which composed the music
"anthem" of democracy, unbwogable, that aroused Kenyans to vote, and that
Kenyans sang and danced to as they voted out the Moi dictatorship in 2002.
Unbwogable is a new political sheng word that is recognized by virtually all
Kenyans and captures the new positive nationwide energy of political resistance
and cultural creation that has engulfed Kenya. Unbwogable, in typical sheng
fashion, is derived from an ethnic-specific word, (in this specific case Luo) and
dragged into nationwide service. The term Unbwogable has been invested with
the nationally understood political idea that the "power ofthe people is supreme;'
that the people rej ect dictatorship and elect leaders oftheir choice as they struggle
together to build a new national culture of Kenya.
Conclusions
There is strong evidence to support the proposition that a national culture of
Kenya is emerging in addition to, not in place of, the 50 ancient ethnic cultures
of Kenya. This national culture of Kenya is emerging because the 34 million
people in Kenya today no longer live in what the philosopher Kwame Anthony
Appiah (2006) has called separate noninteracting "local troops" (p.xiii); and it
has, therefore, become necessary for them to create a national culture that unifies
and enables the former "local troops" to live together within one nation state, and
increasingly within one globalizing planet. According to Appiah (2006),
Each person you know about and can affect is someone to whom
you have responsibilities: to say this is just to affirm the very
idea of morality. The challenge, then, is to take minds and hearts
formed over the long millennia of living in local troops and
equip them with ideas and institutions that will allow us to live
together as the global tribe we have become. (p. xiii)
The people of Kenya have created and are actively creating "ideas and institutions
that will allow us to live together:' These ideas include harambee, a widened
multiethnic ubuntu as seen in Ms. Wangunyu's and Mr. Odinga's ngurario, Kenyan
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as an identity) a national literature in Kiswahili and English) universal free primary
education) and so on. And the institutions include a national administration
that is largely accepted by the majority as legitimate) with elections) the use of
Kiswahili language nationwide) a physical infrastructure of roads and railways
and airports) a telecommunications infrastructure) public schools) and so on. It
is these ideas and institutions that enable us to live together in Kenya) and that in
my opinion) constitute the emerging national culture of Kenya.
The difficult and long-term Kenyan project of building an effective national
culture within the global system in which we all live is higWy incomplete: Some
dimensions ofthe national culture) such as the institution ofKiswahili as the national
language of Kenya and the spread of ugali and sukuma wiki as key newer parts of
the national cuisine) are secure and fully accepted; while some other dimensions)
such as national consciousness and national ideolog}', are weak and just beginning
to evolve. Political activists) academic intellectuals) civil society organizations) and
Sheng artists are actively engaged in the process of creating a Kenyan national
consciousness and a Kenyan national ideology that will defy the anti-African forces
that Ngugi Wa Thiongo (1986) p. 3) has called the "cultural bomb:' and enrich and
secure the place of the emerging national culture of Kenya.
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